In this paper we formulate and analyze an N -player stochastic game of the classical fuel follower problem and its Mean Field Game (MFG) counterpart. For the N -player game, we obtain the Nash Equilibrium (NE) explicitly by deriving and analyzing a system of HamiltonJacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, and by establishing the existence of a unique strong solution to the associated Skorokhod problem on an unbounded polyhedron with an oblique reflection. For the MFG, we derive a bang-bang type NE under some mild technical conditions and by the viscosity solution approach. We also show that this solution is an -NE to the N -player game,
Introduction
The classic fuel follower problem concerns controlling a single moving object on a real line whose movement is modeled by a standard Brownian motion. The controller controls the position of her object in a possibly non-continuous way, i.e., with singular controls. Her objective is to minimize over an infinite-time horizon, the total amount of control and the total L 2 distance of the object to the origin, with a discount factor. The optimal control derived by Beneš, Shepp, and Witsenhausen [4] is shown to be of a "bang-bang" type. That is, there exists a threshold c such that when the object is within [−c, c], it will be idling; and when it is outside [−c, c], the controller will apply the minimal push needed to bring it back within [−c, c]. The controlled dynamics is thus a reflected Brownian motion, with local times at c and −c as a result of the minimal push. This problem has a number of generalizations; see, for example, Karatzas [28] , Karatzas and Shreve [30] , and Shreve and Soner [38] . In particular, Karatzas [28] derives a similar bang-bang type optimal control when the L 2 distance is relaxed to a class of convex and symmetric functions; see Figure 1 . Due to its simplicity, the fuel follower problem has many applications and has inspired a number of research topics, including reflected stochastic differential equations and semimartingales, Skorokhod problems, and regularities of fully nonlinear PDEs with gradient constraints. See, for instance, Harrison and Williams [23] , Soner and Shreve [40] , Varadhan and Williams [41] , Williams [42] , Dai and Williams [14] , Kruk [32] , Atar and Budhiraja [1] , Budhiraja and Ross [7] , Evans [18] , and Hynd [27] .
Our work. In this paper we formulate and analyze an N -player stochastic game of the fuel follower problem and its Mean Field Game (MFG) counterpart. In the N -player game, there are N controllers and N objects with each controller controlling one object. Each controller minimizes her total amount of control and the total distance of her object to the center of the N objects. The interaction among the N controllers in the game is to ensure that their own objects closely follow each other's movement. We derive the Nash Equilibrium (NE) explicitly (Theorem 5). This result is established in two main steps. The first step is to derive and analyze a system of Hamilton-JacobiBellman (HJB) equations for the value functions and to establish a verification theorem (Theorem 3) for the game. After finding the solution to the HJB system, the second step is to construct a feedback control via proving the existence of a (unique strong) solution to an associated Skorokhod problem on an unbounded polyhedron with an oblique reflection (Theorem 4). For the special case of N = 2, we exploit the symmetric structure to obtain multiple NEs; see Figure 5 .
We then consider the corresponding MFG with N → ∞, where each controller minimizes her total amount of control and the total distance of her object to the empirical mean position of all objects. Our approach to analyze this MFG is to study directly the two coupled PDEs, the backward parabolic type HJB equation and the forward Kolmogorov equation. By further exploiting the problem structure we derive an NE which is of a bang-bang type (Theorem 7). This NE is state independent as in the classical fuel follower problem. We finally discuss the relation between the N -player game and the MFG, and show that this NE to the MFG game is an -NE to the N -player game (Theorem 14).
Our contribution. In general, there are essential technical difficulties in analyzing N -player stochastic games. The underlying HJB system is high dimensional, the existence of its solution is usually hard to analyze, and deriving explicit solutions is even more challenging. Therefore it is in general infeasible to characterize the equilibrium. In the case of the singular control, the HJB equation is even more complex, with additional gradient constraints coming from possible jumps in the control. For MFGs with singular controls, the Hamiltonian for the underlying stochastic control problem diverges and the classical stochastic maximal principle fails. Moreover, due to the possible non-stationarity of the mean information process, the associated HJB equation is parabolic despite the infinite-time horizon setting, making it even more difficult to analyze the regularity of the value functions or to derive explicit solutions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a complete characterization of the NEs for both the N -player stochastic game and the MFG in a singular control setting. Our explicit solutions are derived for a class of convex and symmetric functions, without the usual linearquadratic structure for MFGs with regular controls in Bardi [2] , Bardi and Priuli [3] , Bensoussan, Sung, Yam, and Yung [6] .
Moreover, explicit solutions derived in this paper make it possible to directly compare the structural differences between the MFG and the N -player game. It provides useful insights not only for analyzing general N -player games but also for proper formulations of MFGs. Indeed, MFGs may be very different in nature from N -player games: in the fuel follower problem, the MFG degenerates to a single-player game in the sense that its NE is state independent (Proposition 11 and Proposition 12), while the NEs for the N -player game are state dependent (Theorem 5). The collapse of the MFG to the single player problem is to be expected by the aggregation in the MFG formulation: players become more anticipative when they are assumed to be identical. Our analysis also shows that the NE for a stationary MFG may not be the NE for the corresponding MFG (Remark 15.2).
Related work on stochastic games. There are a number of papers on non-zero-sum two-player games with singular controls. By treating one as a controller and the other as a stopper, where the controller minimizes the finite variation process and the stopper decides the optimal time to terminate the game, Karatzas and Li [29] prove the existence of an NE for the game via a BSDE approach. Hernandez-Hernandez, Simon, and Zervos [24] provide an in-depth analysis of the smoothness of the value function and show that the optimal strategy may not be unique when the controller enjoys a first-move advantage. Kwon and Zhang [33] investigate a game of irreversible investment with singular controls and strategic exit. They characterize a class of market perfect equilibria and identify a set of conditions under which the outcome of the game may be unique despite the multiplicity of the equilibria. De Angelis and Ferrari [15] establish the connection between singular controls and optimal stopping times for a non-zero-sum two-player game. Bensoussan and Frehse [5] consider an N -player game with regular controls and obtain the NE via the maximum principle approach. The closest to our problem setting are those of Mannucci [36] and Hamadene and Mu [22] . They consider the fuel follower problem in a finite-time horizon with a bounded velocity, and establish the existence of an NE of a two-player game. The former analyzes a strongly coupled parabolic system and the latter uses the BSDE technique.
Related work on MFGs. The theory of MFGs has enjoyed tremendous growth since the pioneering works of Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [26] and Lasry and Lions [35] . The MFG provides a tractable approach to the otherwise challenging N -player stochastic games. However, except for the general result that the NE of an MFG is an -Nash equilibrium to the N -player game (see, for instance [26] and Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry, and Lions [10] for regular controls and Guo and Joon [20] for singular controls), there are very limited results on comparing the NE of N -player games and MFGs. The exceptions are Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [12] for systemic risks, Nutz and Zhang [37] for competition, Lacker and Zariphopoulou [34] for portfolio management, and [2] . All these results, however, are with regular controls. For MFGs with singular controls, notions of relaxed stochastic maximal principle or relaxed admissible controls have been introduced to establish the existence of optimal controls; see, for instance, Fu and Horst [19] , Hu, Øksendal, and Sulem [25] , and Zhang [43] .
N -Player Fuel Follower Game

Preliminary: Single Player
The classic fuel follower problem is as follows. Consider a probability space (Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P) with a standard Brownian motion {B t } t≥0 . The position of the object X t is assumed to be
where the pair of control (ξ + , ξ − ) is a non-decreasing, càdlàg process. The goal of the controller is to solve for the value function v(x) of the following optimization problem,
where the admissible control set U is Here α > 0 is a discount factor, {F Xt } t≥0 is the natural filtration of {X t } t≥0 , andξ t = ξ + t + ξ − t is the total accumulative amount of controls, called "fuel usage", hence the term fuel follower problem. In addition, under the assumption A1: The function h : R → R is assumed to be convex, symmetric, twice differentiable, with h(0) ≥ 0, h (x) decreasing on R + , and 0 < k < h (x) ≤ K for some constants K > k > 0, Problem (2.2) is solved (see [4] and [28] ) by analyzing the associated HJB equation
where v x and v xx are the first and second order derivatives of v with respect to x, respectively. The optimal control {ξ * + t , ξ * − t } is shown to be of a bang-bang type given by
where the threshold c > 0 is the unique positive solution to
with
The corresponding value function v(x) ∈ C 2 (R) is given by
In other words, it is optimal for the controller to apply a "minimal" push to keep the object within [−c, c]. Mathematically, the controlled process is a Brownian motion reflected at the boundaries c and −c. The minimal push corresponds to the local time of the Brownian motion at c and −c. See 
N -Player Fuel Follower Game
Now suppose there are N controllers, with each controller controlling one object. For simplicity, let us call such a pair of controller and object a "player". The game is for each player to stay as close as possible to other players.
This N -player game can be formulated as follows. Let X 1 t , . . . , X N t ∈ R N be the positions of players such that for i = 1, . . . , N ,
be the center of these N players at time t, with
t ) be the distance between player i and the center m (N ) t at time t. Here ρ ∈ [0, ∞) is a scaling parameter indicating the strength of interactions among players, the bigger the ρ the stronger the interactions.
The goal of each player i is to minimize, over all admissible controls ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N ∈ S N , the following payoff function
Here the admissible control set S N is defined as 
where α j > 0 is the discount factor for player j and {F (X 1 t ,...,X N t ) } t≥0 is the natural filtration of {(X 1 t , . . . , X N t )} t≥0 . The condition in Eqn. (2.7)
is to facilitate designing feasible control policies when controls involve jumps. Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, we will for simplicity and without loss of generality assume ρ = 1 and α 1 = · · · = α N = α. (See Section 5 for further discussions.)
Solution to the N -Player Game
There are various criteria to measure the performance of strategies in stochastic games. For instance, Pareto Optimality (PO) and Nash Equilibrium (NE) provide two distinct views, with NE focusing on stability and PO on efficiency. An NE framework can be further defined depending on the admissible strategies, resulting in open-loop NEs, closed-loop NEs, and the Markovian NEs. See Carmona [11] for more discussions on these concepts.
In this paper, we will focus on the Markovian NE, also known as the closed-loop NE with a feedback form, specified below. Definition 1. A tuple of admissible controls ξ * = (ξ 1 * , . . . , ξ N * ) ∈ S N is a Markovian NE of the stochastic game (N-player), if for any i = 1, . . . , N , X 0− = x, and any ( ξ −i * , ξ i ) ∈ S N , the following inequality holds,
Here strategies ξ i * and ξ i are deterministic functions of time t and X t = (X 1 t , . . . , X N t ), with the notation ( x −i , y i ) := (x 1 , · · · , x i−1 , y i , x i+1 , · · · , x N ) for any x ∈ R N . J i x; ξ * is called the NE value associated with ξ * .
NE Solutions
The NE solution will be derived in two steps. The first is to derive and analyze the associated HJB system. A verification theorem which provides sufficient conditions for the NE values will be presented, along with a solution to the HJB system. The second step is to construct the corresponding NEs, by solving an associated Skorokhod problem.
NE and the HJB System
First, Definition 2 (Action and waiting regions). Player i's action region A i is defined as
and her waiting region is
Next, a simple heuristic conditional argument via the Dynamic Programming Principle leads to the following HJB system.
for any x ∈ A j , for any j = i,
where (∆ξ j * ,+ ( x), ∆ξ j * ,− ( x)) is the NE by player j when x ∈ A j .
The derivation of (HJB-N) can be illustrated with the case of N = 2. In this case, if (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ A 2 , ∆ξ 2 * = 0. By the definition of NE, player one is not expected to suffer a loss as otherwise she will have incentives to take actions. Therefore,
, ∆ξ 2 * = 0, then the control problem for player one becomes a classical single player control problem. Therefore, w 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) satisfies min
Here −αw 1 + h
x 2 x 2 = 0 corresponds to ∆ξ 1 * = 0, 1 − w 1 x 1 = 0 corresponds to ∆ξ 1 * ,+ > 0, and 1 + w 1
Based on the above HJB system, the following sufficient conditions for an NE can be established.
Theorem 3 (Verification theorem).
For any i = 1, . . . , N , suppose ξ i * ∈ U i N and the corresponding w i (.) = J i (.; ξ * ) satisfies the following
for any x ∈ W −i , and
for any x ∈ A j . Here ∆ξ j * = ∆ξ j * ( x) is the control from player j,
Then ξ * is an NE with value w i .
Proof. Given any
Applying the Itô-Tanaka-Meyers formula (Theorem 14.3.2 in [13] ) to e −αt u i ( X
Note that (vii) implies that with control (
is square integrable, hence a uniformly integrable martingale. Now conditions (ii), (iv), (v), and (vi) suggest
Taking T → ∞, the transversality condition (iii) implies
for any ξ i such that ξ
The next step is to solve the HJB system, with a focus on a threshold-type solution. That is, there exists a constant c N > 0 (to be determined) such that the action region A i and the waiting W i of player i can be decomposed into
where
with the partition
Note the modification of the action region A i by Q i is to avoid simultaneous jumps by multiple players. By definition of Q i , in the event of multiple players in the "action region", the player who is the farthest away from the center intervenes first; in the event that multiple players have the same largest distance to the center, the player with the biggest index intervenes. Now it is easy to check that
Now, a candidate function w i ( x) ∈ C 2 (W −i ) should satisfy the following three properties: First,
The general solution satisfying both (2.14) and (2.13) is given by
Here p N (x) is a particular solution to (2.14) and derived from the cost of "doing nothing", and B is constant yet to be determined.
Now matching the values of w
c N is the unique positive solution to
and
Finally, define
Then it is easy to check that u i ∈ C 2 (R N ) and the candidate solution w i satisfies (HJB-N) and Theorem 3.
NE and the Skorokhod Problem (SP)
Given the NE solution to the N -player game, the corresponding NE can be constructed by finding a solution to an associated SP on an unbounded polyhedron and with a constant oblique reflection on each face. First, define CW the common waiting regions of all players as
with the normal direction of each face given by
Note that CW is an unbounded polyhedron with all of its 2N boundaries parallel to the direction 20) and
. Now, the NE of (N-player) can be fully characterized by the solution to the SP with the data
. (See Appendix A for more background materials.) Theorem 4. There exits a unique strong solution to SP with the data ( x, CW, ( .18) and (2.21). More precisely, the reflected process X * t with X * 0 = x ∈ CW is defined as
where η j (t) is a non-decreasing process with
The idea to prove Theorem 4 is to show first the existence of a weak solution to the SP and next the uniqueness of the strong solution to the SP. Then according to Corollary 3.23 in Karatzas and Shreve [31] and Proposition 1 in Engelbert [17] , there exists a unique strong solution to the SP. The existence of a weak solution to the SP is straightforward, following [14] . The uniqueness of a strong solution is established by extending the result of Dupuis and Ishii [16] on a bounded polyhedron to an unbounded one, via the localization technique. Moreover, the reflection vectors
satisfy the skew symmetry condition for the polyhedron CW according to [42] , hence an additional localization argument shows that (2.22) holds. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
Extended Mapping to R N \ CW
Up to now the NE is derived when x ∈ CW. When x ∈ R N \ CW, the NE would be to jump sequentially to some pointx ∈ ∂CW, and afterwards continues according to the SP with data
Algorithm 1 describes how players sequentially jump to CW. In order to show that this algorithm is well defined, one needs to make sure that such jumps stop in finite steps or converge to a limit point onx ∈ ∂CW, and that the total distance of such sequential jumps is bounded. The detailed argument is given in Appendix B, with the illustration of Figure 8 .
Algorithm 1 Policy: Sequential jumps when x / ∈ CW.
Define mapping,
while π(x) = ∅ do 5:
e j is a unit vector in R N with jth component to be 1
8:
ν 0 ← − e π(x)
10:x ←x + λ * ν 0 Control of player π(x)
11:
x k ←x 12:
Note that this algorithm gives an -NE in finite steps. In the case that the starting point is in the intersection of faces, a small perturbation in the algorithm and in the NE value will recover the case of x ∈ CW. In summary, Theorem 5 (NE for the N -player game). Under Assumption A1, a Markovian NE for game (Nplayer) is given by
24)
where CW is given in (2.18), X * t is the controlled dynamic with X * 0 =x = x + ∆ 0 * ,+ − ∆ 0 * ,− ∈ CW, 25) with { x k } the sequence of jumps prescribed by Algorithm 1. 
MFG for the Fuel Follower Problem
Take N identical, rational, and interchangeable players, whose initial positions are random in R N . Let N → ∞, the MFG for the fuel follower problem is to find
Xt N is the empirical mean position of players at time t, and µ t =
is the empirical distribution, with µ 0− symmetric around m 0− . The admissible control set for MFG is 2) and the corresponding NE value is
NE Solution to the MFG
where c is the solution to (2.4).
The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: Stochastic control problem.
Take the M 1 topology for the Skorokhod space D([0, ∞)) with a Wasserstein distance W 1 ( [39, 19] ). Fix a mean field measure {µ t } t≥0 ∈ P 1 (D([0, ∞))), with m t = xµ t (dx) and P 1 the class of all probability measures with finite moment of first order. Then (3.1) becomes the following timedependent and state-dependent singular control problem,
The corresponding HJB equation forv(s, x) is
Note that (3.5) is a parabolic equation because of µ t despite the infinite horizon. This is different from the elliptic equation (2.3).
We will show thatv(s, x) in (3.4) is a viscosity solution to HJB equation (3.5).
First, under a fixed {µ t } t≥0 , the following dynamic programming principle holds.
Dynamic programming principle (DPP). For all
for any θ ∈ T and θ ≥ s, with T the set of all {F B } t≥0 -stopping times. Here, we adopt the convention that e −αθ(ω) = 0 when θ(ω) = ∞. The proof of DPP (3.6) follows Guo and Pham [21] by extending the state space from R to R + × R. 
• Viscosity sub-solution: for any (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, ∞) × R and for any function φ(t 0 , x 0 ) such that
Proposition 9. Assume that the value functionv(t, x) of (3.4) is continuous with respect to t. Thenv(t, x) is a continuous viscosity solution of the HJB equation (3.5) on [s, ∞) × R. Moreover, v(t, x) is convex and differentiable in x, and for any x, y ∈ R,
Proof. Since h is convex and the pay-off function E
is linear in control (ξ + , ξ − ), the value functionv(s, x) is convex in x. Sincev(s, x) is finite and convex on (−∞, ∞), it is continuous in x. Moreover, consider a special control,
clearlyv(s, x) ≤v(s, y) + |y − x| . We now prove that the value function is a viscosity solution of (3.5).
•
Step A: Viscosity sub-solution. For some (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ R + ×R and φ ∈ C 1,2 (R + ×R) such thatv(t 0 , x 0 ) = φ(t 0 , x 0 ) and φ(t 0 , x 0 ) ≥ v(t 0 , x 0 ) for (t, x) ∈ B (t 0 , x 0 ). That is,v − φ has local maximum at (t 0 , x 0 ). Consider the following admissible control
where 0 ≤ η 1 , η 2 ≤ . Define the exit time
Notice that X has at most one jump at t = t 0 and is continuous on [t 0 , t 0 + τ ). By the DPP,
(3.12) By Itô's lemma,
Combining (3.12) and (3.13),
(3.14)
Now, setting η 1 = η 2 = 0 and letting δ → 0 leads to αφ − φ t − 1 2 φ x,x − h ≤ 0. Next, let η 2 = 0, and note that ξ + t and X t only jump at time t 0 with a size η 1 , therefore
Now, taking δ → 0, dividing by η 1 , and letting η 1 → 0 yields −1 − φ x ≤ 0. Similarly, −1 + φ x ≤ 0. That is, φ is the sub-solution to (3.5), so that
• Step B: Viscosity Super-solution. This is established by a contradiction argument. Suppose otherwise, then there exists
Given any admissible control (ξ + , ξ − ) ∈ U ∞ , consider an exit time τ = inf{t ≥ 0, X t+t 0 / ∈ B (t 0 , x 0 )}, and apply Itô's lemma to e −αt φ(t, X t ),
Notice that for any t 0 ≤ t ≤ t 0 + τ , (t, X t ) ∈B (t 0 , x 0 ). By the Taylor expansion and ∆X t = ∆ξ + t − ∆ξ − t , clearly for any 0 ≤ t < τ :
Thus, By definition of τ , (t 0 + τ −, X t 0 +τ − ) ∈B (t 0 , x 0 ) and (t 0 + τ , X t 0 +τ ) is either on the boundary ∂B (t 0 , x 0 ) or out ofB (t 0 , x 0 ). However, there exists some random variable α ∈ [0, 1] such that,
. Similar as in (3.16), we have
Notice that X t 0 +τ = x α + (1 − α)(∆ξ + t 0 +τ − ∆ξ − t 0 +τ ), and from (3.7), v(t 0 + τ , x α ) ≤v(t 0 + τ , X t 0 +τ ) + (1 − α)(∆ξ
Recalling φ(t 0 + τ , x α ) ≤v(t 0 + τ , x α ), inequalities (3.18) and (3.19) imply
Plugging the above inequality into (3.17), by φ(t 0 , x 0 ) =v(t 0 , x 0 ),
That is, there exists a constant g 0 > 0 such that for any (ξ + , ξ − ) ∈ U ∞ , αE e −ατ (∆ξ
Finally, taking the infimum over all admissible controls (ξ
which is a contradiction.
The differentiability with respect to x can be proved using the convexity of the value function v(s, x) to (3.5). Sincev(s, x) is convex, the left and right derivatives with respect to x,v x− (t, x) andv x+ (t, x) exist for any t ≥ s and x ∈ R. Also,v x− (t, x) ≤v x+ (t, x) by convexity. We argue by contradiction and suppose there exists x 0 ∈ R and t 0 ≥ 0 such thatv x− (t 0 , x 0 ) <v x+ (t 0 , x 0 ). Fix some q in (v x− (t 0 , x 0 ),v x+ (t 0 , x 0 )) and consider the test function
with > 0. Then (t 0 , x 0 ) is a local minimum of (v − φ )(t, x) sincev x− (t 0 , x 0 ) < q = φ x (t 0 , x 0 ) < v x+ (t 0 , x 0 ) and φ t (t 0 , x 0 ) = 0. Hence φ is a viscosity super-solution by definition. That is,
Taking > 0 sufficiently small leads to a contradiction.
Proposition 10 (Optimal Control). Assume A1 and assume thatv t (t, x) is continuous with respect to t, the optimal control to (3.4) under a fixed {µ t } t≥0 ∈ P 1 (D([0, ∞)) ) is of the form
where t ≥ 0, m t = xµ t (dx), and c t = inf{x |v x (t, x) = 1} − m t = − sup{x |v x (t, x) = −1} + m t .
Proof. By Proposition 9,v(t, x) is convex and differentiable in x, hence for any fixed t ∈ [0, ∞), c 1 t := inf{x |v x (t, x) = 1} − m t and c 2 t := − sup{x |v x (t, x) = −1} + m t exist. By the symmetry of Problem (3.1) under a fixed {m t } t≥0 ,v(t, m t + δ) =v(t, m t − δ) andv x (t, m t + δ) = −v x (t, m t − δ) for any fixed t and any δ > 0, hence c 1 t = c 2 t , denoted as c t . Becausev(t, x) is convex in x and continuously differentiable in x and t, one can apply the generalized Itô's formula tov(t, x) with (3.22) and use a similar argument as the verification theorem in [28] to obtain the optimality of (3.22) .
Given the optimal control (3.22), define a mapping
Step 2: Consistency.
Given Proposition 10 and a fixed flow {µ t } t≥0 , the optimal control (ξ + t ,ξ − t ) to (3.5) is a bangbang type and the controlled processX t is a reflected Brownian motion with two time-dependent reflected boundaries m t + c t and m t − c t . m t + c t , m t − c t ∈ C([0, ∞]) sincev(t, x) is continuous and differentiable. By Theorem 2.6 in Burdzy, Kang, and Ramanan [9] , there exists a unique solution, X t , to the SP with time varying domain {(t, x) | m t − c t ≤ x ≤ c t + m t } such thatX t is a càdàg process. Furthermore, by Theorem 2.2 in Burdy, Chen, and Sylvester [8] , the Kolmogorov forward equation forμ t can be described as 23) with the initial distribution p(0, x) =μ 0 ∈ P 1 (R), wherê
By Theorem 2.9 in [8] , given m t + c t , m t − c t ∈ C([0, ∞)), the Kolmogorov forward equation (3.23) with the initial distribution p(0, x) = δ(x) has a solution, which is the transition density function ofX t .
Step 3: Fixed point analysis. Denoteμ t as the distribution ofX t , obviouslyμ
Now, define a mapping Γ :
One can then update m t , and have
(3.26) comes from (3.23), (3.27) is from integration by part, and (3.28) follows from the boundary conditions. Since µ 0 is symmetric around m 0− and the optimal control (3.22) is an odd function around m t for any t ≥ 0, the distribution p(t, x) is symmetric around m 0− for any t ≥ 0.
Clearly m t = m 0− is a solution to the fixed point equation (3.29) . This fixed point to Γ is an NE to the MFG (3.1) and the associated NE value is smooth in both x, t.
4 Relation between the N -player game and the MFG When h(x) = x 2 , c N is a decreasing function of N .
Convergence of Game Values
Next, denote v i (N ) as the NE value of player i in the N -player game. By (2.26), when
is independent of x. Moreover, from Proposition 11 and the smoothness of P N (x), it is easy to verify that
That is,
, where v * is the NE value of player i in MFG (3.1). 
Approximating the N -player Game by the MFG
One can further show that the NE of MFG given in (3.2) is an -NE for the N -player game in (N-player) when ρ = 1.
Definition 13 ( -NE).
For the game (N-player) with an initial distribution µ 0− , a control vector ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N ) is called its -NE, if for any i = 1, . . . , N and any control ξ i such that
Here X i 0− (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ) are independent samples from distribution µ 0− , and S N is defined in (2.7). To see that ξ * = ξ 1 * , . . . , ξ N * ∈ S N , define
Then the control in (4.3) corresponds to the action region A mf g,
The independence of {B 1 t , . . . , B N t } and the continuity of {X 1 * t , . . . , X N * t } t>0 imply that for any t ≥ 0 P Π i=1,...,N dξ i * t = 0 = 1. Suppose that only one player, and without loss of generality, player one, deviates her control
) from all the other players such that ( ξ −i * , η) ∈ S N . LetX 1 t be the new position of player one under control (η
where U t is a process between
Similarly,
Moreover, under the control (4.3),
Now, to minimize the following payoff function
is equivalent to solving the original fuel follower problem (2.2) with a modified running cost h(
Since the value function for (2.2) is of a linear growth,
where v * (x) is defined in (3.3) and the expectation in (4.6) is with respect to the initial distribution µ 0− . The above analysis holds for any (η
Hence the conclusion.
Discussions
Multiple Explicit NEs for N = 2
When N = 2, h is symmetric with h(
t ) = h
. This symmetry simplifies significantly the solution structure and allows for the construction of multiple NEs. Indeed, given the partition Q i in (2.13) for N = 2, Q 1 = 0, Q 2 = R 2 , one can write the NE and their corresponding values explicitly.
where c 2 > 0 is the unique positive solution of
And the NE values are
(5.4) There is in fact more than one NE. For instance, in addition to the above constructed NE, labeled as Case 1, there are more NEs, including
In Case 4, clearly
and the associated NE values are
and The proposition follows from simple calculations. Take h(x) = x 2 ,
One can verify that 
2 − x 2 + x 1 , 
give a Markovian NE. The corresponding NE values are
2 , x 2 )
2 ,
2 ≤ x 1 − x 2 ≤ −c
2 , x 2 ), c
2 ),
2 .
(5.7) Figure 7 shows the NE defined in Corollary 15.1. 
More Remarks
Remark 15.1. The analysis throughout the paper assumes ρ = 1. In the case of ρ = 1, the analysis for NE is similar. In fact, the construction of the NEs will be simpler because the CW will be bounded as the normal direction of each face is no longer parallel to (1, · · · , 1).
Remark 15.2. In the MFG (3.1), if instead a stationary MFG (SMFG) is specified by replacing h(X t −m t ) with h(X t −lim t→∞ m t ), the associated parabolic HJB equation (3.5) will become elliptic. In this case, one can verify that there are infinitely many NEs of the bang-bang type, with the controlled dynamics reflected at m − c and m + c for any constant m. Note, however, the NE for the SMFG when m = m 0 is not an NE for the MFG (3.1).
Now the proof of Theorem 4 follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 18 (Existence of the weak solution to SP). Fix x ∈ CW. There exists a weak solution to the SP with the data (CW, (
It is a semimartingale reflected Brownian motion (SRBM) starting from x.
In fact, this weak solution is unique in a weak sense, see [14] .
Proof of Lemma 18. Following the notation in [14] , define the maximal set to characterize the points on ∂CW as follows. Take J = {1, 2, · · · , 2N } the index set of the 2N faces of CW. For each
Let us first show that for any maximal K K K, |K K K| ≤ N − 1. To see this claim, denote
It follows from some calculations that det(N mat ) = N − 1, implying that for any K K K ⊂ J J J with |K K K| = N , ∩F j∈K K K = ∅. Moreover, for any maximal K K K, |K K K| ≤ N − 1. Now checking the conditions (S.a) and (S.b) for any maximal K K K reduces to checking these conditions for the maximal K K K with |K K K| = N − 1.
Note that for any i = 1, · · · , N , F i and F N +i are parallel faces such that F i ∩ F N +i = ∅, there is no maximal K K K for which both i ∈ K K K and N + i ∈ K K K. Thus, take any
Denote m as the number of indexes in K K K which is strictly smaller than N , then N − 1 − m is the number of indexes in K K K that are greater than N .
To check (S.a), define n =
Next, the uniqueness of solution in the strong sense is established by the localization technique. That is, construct a sequence of bounded region W k (k ∈ N + ) such that
where W k satisfies the condition in [16] . Then define a sequence of stopping times associated with W k (k ∈ N + ) and extend the strong uniqueness result on bounded regions in [16] .
Lemma 19 (Uniqueness of the strong solution to SP). Given a probability space (Ω, F, P), suppose there are two strong solutions X * t and X * t to the SP with the data x, CW, (
Proof of Lemma 19. First, the uniqueness on a bounded region. To this end, define the bounded region
as the index set of x. Following [16] , we will show that, for each x ∈ ∂W k , there exists
(S.c) N −1 . By [16] , there exists a unique strong solution ( X kNow, let ( X k t , η k ) be the strong solution to the SP with the data x , W k , ( d 1 , · · · , d 2N +2 ), { B t } t≥0 . Then by [16] , there exists a constant C k < ∞ such that for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
To finish the proof, now suppose that there are two strong solutions ( X * t , η * ) t≥0 and ( X * t , η * ) t≥0 to the SP with the data x, CW, ( d 1 , · · · , d 2N ) , { B t } t≥0 , with d i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2N ) defined in (2.21) and X * 0 = X * 0 = x ∈ CW. Suppose there exists M := M ( x) such that x ∈ W k for k ≥ M . Define τ k = inf{t : X * t ∈ F 2N +2 }. Then the uniqueness of the strong solution to SP with the data ( x, W k , γ (k) , { B t } t≥0 ) implies that for k ≥ M , P x X * t = X * t , t ≤ τ k = 1, (5.10)
By the continuity of the probability measure,
Now it remains to show lim k→∞ τ k = ∞ a.s.. Suppose otherwise, then there exists τ * = τ * (ω) < ∞ such that lim k→∞ τ k = τ * pathwise. Therefore, Thus in step k + 1, the player should jump at a minimum distance of
4N ∆, which is strictly greater than 2 when N > 1. Therefore x k +1 / ∈ B (x), which is a contradiction. Hencex = lim k→∞ x k ∈ ∂CW.
To see that the total distance of sequential jumps is bounded, rewrite k } k and {x (1) k } k , the total distance of jumps is bounded pointwise. . There existsc N > 0 such that m N (x) ≥ 1 on (c N , ∞) with 0 <c N < c N < ∞ for N ≥ 2. And there existsc > 0 such that m 1 (x) ≥ 1 on (c, ∞) with 0 <c < c < ∞. Now 0 < tanh (x) = 1 − tanh 2 (x) < 1 for any x ∈ (0, ∞), therefore f N (x) < 0 on (c N , ∞) for N ≥ 2 and f 1 (x) < 0 on (c, ∞). Since f N converges to f 1 pointwise, for any > 0, there exists an N such that for any n ≥ N , |f n (c)| = |f n (c) − f 1 (c)| ≤ . By the uniqueness of the zeros for each function f N , c N → c as N → ∞.
Secondly, when h = x 2 , f N reduces to 
